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Abstract 
The study of parliamentary party unity has followed several lines of enquiry: describing the variation 
across political actors, contexts and time; comparing the multidimensional and dynamic aspects of 
parliamentary party unity; explaining it from a rational-institutional perspective with emphasis on 
macro-level arrangements and individual rational motivations. However, we know relatively little 
about how party organizations shape parliamentary party unity and this special section seeks to 
address this gap in the literature. This introductory article explains how the special section makes 
theoretical contributions to the concept of unity, provides alternative measurements and 
investigates several alternative determinants of unity. 
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Introduction 
Parliamentary party unity is a central feature in contemporary parliamentary democracies. It 
has important effects on government’s survival and stability, coalition behaviour, bargaining 
power of the party-in-public-office, and electoral success (Boucek, 2012; Giannetti and 
Benoit, 2009; Kam, 2009; Pedersen, 2010; Saalfeld, 2009; Tavits, 2012). Consequently, a 
better understanding of its determinants and functioning mechanisms is also crucial. An 
extensive body of literature has examined the variation in parliamentary party unity across 
time and/or space, within or across specific national contexts (Bowler et al., 1999; Carey, 
2007; Hazan, 2006; Sieberer, 2006; Stecker, 2013). While this research has extended our 
understanding of parliamentary unity and of its determinants, it has nevertheless been 
plagued by several limitations. First, these studies often relied on a unidimensional definition 
of party unity, conceived as the act of MPs from the same party voting in a unitary manner 
(Janda, 1993; Olson, 2003). Yet, more recent perspectives have highlighted the 
multidimensional and dynamic aspects of parliamentary party unity, which results from a 
sequential process of agreement, loyalty and discipline (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011; 
Hazan, 2003; van Vonno et al., 2014).  
Second, measures of parliamentary party voting unity extensively relied on available 
recorded (roll-call) voting data, although they only provide partial information on legislators’ 
genuine relationship to their party (Carrubba et al., 2006; Hug, 2010) and on what occurs 
behind closed doors. Third, explanations of parliamentary party unity were predominantly 
entrenched in rational-institutional approaches, while sociological explanations have often 
been neglected. Besides, while these studies have highlighted the impact of macro-level 
institutional settings and individual rational motivations (Bowler et al., 1999; Carey, 2007; 
Carey and Shugart, 1995; Depauw and Martin, 2009; Gherghina and Chiru, 2014; Kam, 2009; 
Sieberer, 2006), we know relatively little about how party-level organisational factors shape 
the various dimensions of parliamentary party unity (Little and Farrell, 2017; Tavits, 2012).  
This special section seeks to address these gaps in the literature. This special section 
gathers contributions that were presented during the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops 
(Nottingham 2017), in a workshop dedicated to ‘Rethinking intra-party cohesion in time of 
party transformation’ (Workshop directors: Caroline Close and Sergiu Gherghina) and makes 
a three-fold contribution. As presented below, the articles (1) develop a multidimensional 
and dynamic conception of unity; (2) rely on diverse methodological tools to measure the 
various dimensions of unity, and provide original data; (3) investigate the determinants of 
unity at several levels of the polity. 
 Defining parliamentary party unity: A multidimensional and dynamic perspective 
The articles included in this special section examine unity in parliamentary parties as a 
dynamic and multidimensional concept occurring through ‘sequences’, and take into 
account both attitudinal and behavioural dimensions of legislative unity. This understanding 
of parliamentary party unity relies first on the distinction between unity, cohesion and 
discipline (Hazan, 2003). Unity describes the degree to which legislators from the same party 
act in unison (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011), and results from both cohesion and 
discipline. Cohesion constitutes the sociological dimension or voluntary pathway towards 
unity, while discipline is associated with rationality and compulsion. Second, it relies on the 
distinction between at least two dimensions of cohesion: on the one hand, party agreement 
or shared preferences, defined as ‘the extent to which co-partisans agree with one another 
when voting on legislation’ (van Vonno et al., 2014, p. 112); on the other hand, party loyalty, 
which derives from the legislators’ internalisation of the norms of party unity and solidarity. 
Third, the contributions connect the various dimensions of parliamentary party unity with 
Hirschman’s (1970) framework of ‘Exit, Voice & Loyalty’, and empirically investigate the 
relationship between these categories: voice/disagreement, loyalty, and exit/party switching 
– the ultimate lack of unity. 
Zittel and Nyhuis examine the voting behaviour of legislators in the German Bundestag, 
and relate this behaviour to unity in policy preferences. Similarly, Bhattacharya and 
Papageorgiou investigate legislators’ dissenting preferences in the German Bundestag during 
the Greek crisis and their related voting behaviour. Close, Gherghina and Sierens focus on 
legislators’ pre-floor attitudes across several European national assemblies, and try to 
capture their degree of (dis)agreement and (dis)loyalty towards their party. Mickler, as well 
as Roos, demonstrate the processual nature of party unity, which can be built despite 
potential policy disagreement, either in parliamentary committee in the Dutch Tweede 
Kamer and German Bundestag (Mickler) or within European parliamentary party groups 
through both socialisation effects and advantages provided by party groups (Roos). Pedersen 
and Kaldahl Nielsen, as well as Volpi, concentrate on party switching, that is, cases where 
unity was breached and where ‘exit’ constituted a more valuable option for legislators.  They 
relate these switching behaviours with disagreement/voice patterns at both the individual 
and party levels. 
 
Measuring parliamentary party unity: Methodological diversity and innovation 
The contributions provide a good balance in terms of methodology, and a relevant overview 
of the tools that can be used to grasp the various dimensions of parliamentary party unity. 
While recorded voting data (roll-call votes) have proven useful to grasp legislators’ voting 
behaviour, and still constitute a benchmark in the study of legislative unity, they 
nevertheless involve several limitations. First, as only a relatively small proportion of votes 
are recorded in many assemblies, and as leaders may strategically ‘call the roll’ to discipline 
their fellows, roll-call voting data tend to overestimate the level of pre-floor unity within 
parliamentary parties.  Unity or so-called cohesion indexes (Attiná, 1990; Rice, 1925)  built 
on recorded votes indeed score pretty high across parliamentary democracies, with only 
small variations (Depauw and Martin, 2009; Little and Farrell, 2017). Second, legislators’ 
voting behaviour, even when not recorded, often results from intra-party processes of 
consensus-building, and is greatly affected by the pressure of the party (leader) and fellow 
co-partisans to stick to the party line and to appear united when voting on pieces of 
legislation. Voting data thus poorly accounts for pre-floor levels of unity within a 
parliamentary party, and do not allow grasping what occurs within the ‘black box’ of 
parliamentary parties.  
Hence, the contributions presented in this special issue combine various tools and 
data, in order to grasp both visible and less visible sequences of unity, at different levels.  
Zittel and Nyhuis, as well as Bhattacharya and Papageorgiou, use recorded voting data to 
measure visible defection from the party line. Zittel and Nyhuis further rely on a 
quantitative-text based analysis of ‘explanations of votes’ (EoV) in order to grasp legislators’ 
ideological positioning independently from their voting behaviour, while Bhattacharya and 
Papageorgiou analyse both speeches and EoV in the same purpose. Both analyses 
demonstrate how speeches and vote explanations can be used by individual legislators to 
highlight or voice their individual stances on floor votes and criticism on their parties’ 
position, while still sticking to the party line in the final vote. Close, Gherghina and Sierens 
use quantitative surveys of legislators to measure attitudes of agreement and loyalty, and 
show that these attitudes show greater variation than usual voting scores. Mickler and Roos 
provide new and comprehensive material on unity-building by using qualitative interviews 
with (former) legislators. Their contributions permit to get deeper into the process of unity 
building at both the individual and party levels. The papers examining party switching also 
rely on original datasets, which were built either using purely quantitative data (Volpi) or 
mixed-methods (Pedersen and Kaldahl Nielsen). These latter contributions demonstrate that 
while party unity has become the norm in parliamentary democracies, exit behaviours are 
not that uncommon across time, parties and legislatures. 
 
Explaining parliamentary party (dis)unity: a multi-level approach 
Existing research already set forth the influence of multiple factors on the degree of 
parliamentary party unity, or lack thereof, at different levels of the polity. At the macro-
level, scholars highlighted the role of state structure, legislative rules and functioning, and 
electoral systems (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011; Carey, 2007; Depauw and Martin, 2009; 
Kam, 2009; Patzelt, 2003; Sieberer, 2006). At the micro level, scholars examined the impact 
of individual resources, socio-demographic factors and strategic motivations (Gherghina and 
Chiru, 2014; Kam, 2009; Tavits, 2009). Party-level factors were also considered, such as 
candidate selection rules, size of the party, government and opposition position and size of 
the governing majority (Depauw and Martin, 2009; Hazan and Rahat, 2006; Hix, 2004; Rombi 
and Seddone, 2017; Sieberer, 2006). However, this research has rarely questioned the effect 
of extra-parliamentary party organisational features, such as intra-party power, intra-party 
democracy and party ideology (Close, 2016; Hazan and Rahat, 2015). Yet, organisational 
aspects, as well as the ideological identity of parties, have been and are still changing 
considerably and require to be brought back into the study of parliamentary party unity. 
The articles presented in this special section examine the determinants of legislative 
(dis)unity at several levels, and provide evidence of party-level variations. Besides, while the 
existing research is dominated by a rational-institutional approach that mostly conceives 
legislators as strategic actors, who seek to fulfil specific objectives (i.e. vote-seeking, policy-
seeking, and office-seeking) (Strøm, 1997) that are ‘institutionally conditioned’ (Hazan and 
Rahat, 2006, p. 366), the contributions in this special section interestingly combine rational-
institutional approaches and more sociological explanations of legislators’ attitudes and 
behaviour.  
Zittel and Nyhuis put forth legislators’ strategic motivations (office and vote), and 
their findings highlight specifically the role of electoral incentives. Bhattacharya and 
Papageorgiou underline the effect of legislators’ electoral connection, experience and career 
prospects, as well as gender. These two contributions also uncover party-level variations 
related notably to government and opposition dynamics. Mickler and Roos provide empirical 
evidence of the role of informal processes and socialisation throughout various 
parliamentary institutions and working procedures. Finally, three contributions focus on the 
effect of extra-parliamentary party characteristics: Close, Gherghina and Sierens explore the 
role of intra-party democracy; Pedersen and Kaldahl Nielsen investigate the impact of intra-
party power distribution, and Volpi considers the role of party ideology.  
 
Conclusion  
The contributions presented in this special section share a similar understanding of 
parliamentary party unity as a multidimensional concept, which can refer to both 
behavioural and attitudinal phenomena, and can be grasped at both party and individual-
level. In behavioural terms, at the party level, parliamentary party unity refers to a party 
acting in unison; at the individual level, it describes a legislator acting according to her/his 
party guidelines or in line with a majority of her/his co-partisans. In attitudinal terms, at the 
party level, unity can either refer to an ideologically homogeneous party, or a party in which 
the norms of party solidarity or loyalty are well-entrenched and effective; at the individual-
level, it describes a legislator having preferences close to that of her/his party or co-partisans 
(or a legislator who mostly agree with her/his party’s policies or positioning), or a legislator 
that has a great sense of loyalty towards her/his party. Parliamentary party disunity in 
behavioural terms can result from a lack of ideological consensus and/or loyalty; but can be 
counter-balanced by party discipline – the parliamentary party leader using carrots and 
sticks to enforce a united behaviour among her/his fellows. The ultimate lack of unity occurs 
when even discipline becomes ineffective, and translates into one or several legislators 
leaving the party, thereby threatening the integrity and stability of the group. 
Because of this comprehensive and multidimensional understanding of parliamentary 
party unity, as well as for all the reasons exposed above, we believe that this special section 
brings an important contribution to the study of parliamentary party unity.  
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